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Abstract
We argue that increased foreign borrowing by the private sector reduces the
risk that a developing country's government defaults on its foreign debt.
We present a simple model in which private foreign borrowing re°ects a
surge of private entrepreneurship. A larger \entrepreneurial class" raises
the political costs of default and reduces the government's incentive to
deny repayment. The results of our empirical analysis support the model's
key hypothesis.
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11 Introduction
For a long time, debt-creating capital °ows to emerging markets and developing
countries used to be dominated by government borrowing. However, this domi-
nance has steadily vanished in recent years: while in 1990 the public sector still
accounted for 84 percent of all foreign loans disbursed to countries covered by
the World Bank's Global Development Finance, this share amounted to a mere 38
percent in 2004 (see Figure 1). Of course, these average ¯gures mask a substan-
tial degree of cross-country heterogeneity: in 2004, private borrowing was many
times higher than public borrowing in emerging economies like Chile or Thailand,
but in numerous low-income countries the privilege to access international capital
markets is still reserved to the government.
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of private foreign borrowing
for sovereign creditworthiness. The prevailing belief is that private external bor-
rowing contributes to higher sovereign risk. This belief is based on the notion
that large-scale private borrowing creates vulnerabilities that may eventually lead
to ¯nancial crises. The public sector may be forced to assume at least part of
private debt, and the real exchange rate depreciation associated with a \sudden
stop" may cause debt-service di±culties for the government. Following this logic,
both private and public external debt pose a threat to external ¯scal sustain-
ability.1 By contrast, we advance a political economy argument which suggests
that a larger amount of private external debt is likely to enhance sovereign cred-
1The view that governments bail out the private sector is supported by anecdotal evidence
on private debt nationalizations after currency and ¯nancial crises. For instance Reinhart
(2002) states that "Even if the government itself has little outstanding debt, history has shown
that, time after time, governments assume private sector debt during currency crises." Note,
however, that most of the studies which ¯nd a negative association of sovereign ratings with
the overall amount of external debt (see, e.g., Cantor and Packer (1996),Haque et al. (1996),
Harms and Rauber (2006)) are based on sample periods in which public debt constituted the
bulk of total external debt.
2itworthiness. We claim that governments have a lower incentive to default on
their foreign debt if the private sector is more exposed to international capital
markets. Our key argument runs as follows: public borrowing eventually leads
to repayment obligations which force the government to raise taxes. Without a
countervailing force, a government that maximizes its political support among the
domestic population is tempted to deny repayment. We argue that private-sector
access to international capital markets creates such a countervailing force, i.e. it
generates a class of agents who are vulnerable to the sanctions and disruptions
resulting from government default. As the size and stake of this group increases,
the attractiveness of sovereign default declines.
To present this argument in a transparent fashion and to get some guidance
for the speci¯cation of our empirical tests, we develop a simple political-economy
model in which the extent of private foreign borrowing is commensurate with the
size of an economy's "entrepreneurial class", i.e. the number of agents who in-
vest in new ¯rms and hire workers to reap the pro¯ts and capital gains associated
with ¯rm ownership. Public borrowing is exogenous, and a share of disbursed
loans is allocated to infrastructure projects which raise total factor productiv-
ity. At the end of each period, the government chooses between repayment and
default, taking into account the interests of workers and entrepreneurs. While
workers unambiguously support default because they prefer a lower tax burden,
entrepreneurs anticipate that the value of their ¯rms drops in case of default and
thus support repayment. The larger the entrepreneurial class, i.e. the larger the
volume of private foreign borrowing, the greater the likelihood that the political
costs of default exceed its bene¯ts, and the higher the likelihood of repayment.
Having developed our main hypothesis - namely, that private foreign bor-
rowing reduces the risk of sovereign default - we test it by using data on country
creditworthiness, the composition of foreign borrowing, and a broad set of control
variables. A ¯rst impression of the relationship between private foreign borrowing
and sovereign risk is provided by Figure 2, which plots the Institutional Investor's
3measure of country creditworthiness (IICCR) against the average value of pri-
vate foreign borrowing relative to GNI (in percentage terms). The correlation is
strongly positive, even if we remove the three observations for which private for-
eign borrowing and creditworthiness was particularly high.2 But, of course, this is
no proof of the causal relationship suggested above. Instead, the scatterplot may
merely illustrate that lower sovereign risk encourages private foreign borrowing.3
Further evidence in favor of our hypothesis is provided by Figure 3: the top pan-
els plot the cross-country averages of private and public foreign debt (as a share
of GNI) before and after increases of Moody's sovereign ratings (at t = 0) which
were not preceded by rating changes in the previous three years.4 The bottom
panels do the same for private and public foreign borrowing: notably, private debt
and borrowing are on the rise while public debt and borrowing are declining prior
to a rating increase, indicating that, on average, increases in private debt and
borrowing preceded improvements of country creditworthiness. Again, however,
this dynamic pattern does not necessarily prove causality { especially since other
factors that in°uence borrowing behavior and perceived sovereign risk are not
taken into account.
The key challenge we face in testing the model is therefore to come to terms
with the simultaneity of both private borrowing and sovereign risk and to control
for other factors that might have an impact on these variables. Using a host
of alternative empirical approaches and speci¯cations, we demonstrate that the
data support our hypothesis: exogenous shifts in the volume of private foreign
2The data points refer to ¯ve-year averages between 1980 and 2004. The three extreme
observations are Hungary, Estonia and Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2004.
3Several papers (Durbin and Ng (2005), Borensztein et al. (2006a), Borensztein et al.
(2006b)) document that governments' credit-ratings in°uence private borrowing by constituting
a ceiling for the credit ratings of most private entities.
4By focusing on rating increases that were preceded by long periods of stable creditworthiness
assessments, we are reducing the likelihood that changes in private and public debt just re°ect
past rating increases.
4borrowing (relative to GNI) have a signi¯cant impact on a government's perceived
creditworthiness.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section o®ers a brief
review of the relevant literature and highlights our own contribution. Section 3
presents the theoretical model. Section 4 introduces our empirical speci¯cation,
the data we use, and comments on the results. Section 5 summarizes and con-
cludes. Detailed information on data de¯nitions and sources are given in the data
appendix.
2 Review of the Literature
There is a rich literature on the causes and consequences of sovereign risk. In
the absence of a supra-national enforcement institution, the incentive to repay
crucially hinges on the sanctions a government faces in case of default. These
sanctions can be subdivided into two main types: starting with Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (1981), it has been argued that governments avoid default in order to preserve
access to future loans. However, this idea was criticized by Bulow and Rogo®
(1989) who demonstrate that a sovereign debtor can achieve a higher welfare
level by denying repayment and by investing the outstanding amount in a third
country. Hence, unless it is possible to exclude countries from ¯nancial markets
both as debtors and as creditors, only the threat of direct sanctions { including
negative \reputation spillovers" (Cole and Kehoe (1997)) { is e®ective to enforce
repayment.5
While the notion that defaulting governments are shut o® from interna-
tional capital markets gets mixed empirical support (see Eichengreen and Lindert
(1989), Gelos et al. (2003) and Miller et al. (2006)), there is ample evidence that
a debt crisis imposes large costs on the economy: Rose (2005) demonstrates that
5An authoritative survey of this discussion is provided by Eaton and Fernandez (1995).
5the volume of trade is reduced by as much as eight percent for a considerable
time span after a sovereign default. And Arteta and Hale (2005, 2006) show
that private ¯rms ¯nd it much harder to access international credit markets once
government creditworthiness has plummeted.
It is quite obvious that the costs of default do not a®ect all citizens of a
country in a symmetric fashion. In fact, there is strong evidence that \political
factors" - e.g. the proximity of elections or the characteristics of the instititutional
environment - have a signi¯cant e®ect on countries' perceived creditworthiness
and the likelihood of default.6 Nevertheless, there are few studies that explicitly
consider the distributional e®ects of debt crises and agents' con°icting interests
with respect to sovereign default. Two notable contributions in this spirit are
Tomz (2002) and Saiegh (2005). In his paper, Tomz o®ers a careful analysis of
the shift in popular attitude that preceded the Argentine default of 2001. Saiegh
sketches a model which is based on the Eaton/Gersovitz (1981) assumption that
countries are denied access to international capital markets after a default: since
agents di®er in their ownership of productive assets, the net bene¯ts from default
are distributed unevenly across the population. Whether the government defaults
is thus a matter of group size and political in°uence.7
The original contribution of our paper is to highlight one kind of distributional
con°ict that we consider particularly relevant for a government's default decision -
namely, the con°ict between an \entrepreneurial class" whose fortunes are closely
linked to the government's treatment of foreign lenders, and the large group of
6See, e.g., Manasse et al. (2003), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2004), Block and Vaaler
(2004).
7Amador (2002) highlights another channel through which political considerations enter a
government's default decision: if parties alternate in power, their ability to implement the
Bulow/Rogo® (1989) investment scheme is limited by the incentive to overconsume. In a
world in which defaulting countries face an embargo by international investors, the incumbent
government may therefore choose repayment.
6workers for whom the costs of default are negligible. To the best of our knowl-
edge, none of the existing empirical studies on sovereign ratings (see,e.g.,Cantor
and Packer (1996), Haque et al. (1996), Harms and Rauber (2006)) explores the
potentially di®erent impact of public and private external debt. By contrast,
there is a growing number of studies that explore how sovereign creditworthiness
and default a®ect the access of the private sector to external credit.8 An analysis
of how the costs in°icted on the private sector shape the political support for
debt repayment enhances our understanding of sovereign default and improves
our assessment of governments' creditworthiness.
3 A simple model of international borrowing
and default risk
3.1 Structure and assumptions
We consider a small open economy where ¯rms produce a tradable good whose
price is normalized to one. There is a large number of risk-neutral, ex-ante
identical agents with total mass one. Agents live for one period and leave no
bequests.
At the beginning of every period, the government borrows an exogenous
amount G at the gross interest rate RG. A share Á of government borrowing
is used productively while (1 ¡Á)G is consumed by the government. We assume
that there are no domestic savings, hence all borrowing { public and private
{ is international borrowing. At the end of the period, the government decides
8See, e.g., Arteta and Hale (2006), Durbin and Ng (2005), Borensztein et al. (2006a), Boren-
sztein et al. (2006b). Jeske (2006) models the default incentives of private and public borrowers
and concludes that the externalities associated with non-regulated private borrowing warrant
a control of international capital °ows. However, he does not consider the impact of private
borrowing on the likelihood of government default.
7whether to pay back the loan or to default. We denote the likelihood of repayment
by q.
International capital markets are populated by risk-neutral investors who have
access to an asset which pays the risk-free interest rate RW. It follows that
the interest rate paid by the domestic government ( RG) has to satisfy qRG =
RW. In case of default in period t, the government is shut o® from international
capital markets in all subsequent periods, hence Gt+j = 0 for all j ¸ 1.9 If the
government does not default, it has to raise taxes T = RGG to ¯nance principal
and interest payments. We assume that the tax burden is the same for all agents
in the economy.




In (1), Yi is the ¯rm's revenue, Li is the amount of labor employed by ¯rm i,
and µi is an idiosyncratic productivity shock with two realizations: µi 2 f0;1g.
Productivity shocks are identically and independently distributed across ¯rms
and time, and the probability that µi = 1, i.e. that a ¯rm is \successful" in a
given period, is p. As a consequence, a share p of ¯rms is able to produce positive
output while the rest goes out of business. If the government is unable to ¯nance
its expenditure (G = 0) agents have access to an alternative linear production
technology whose output we normalize to zero.
Once government spending has been determined, agents decide whether to
become entrepreneurs or workers.10 An entrepreneur sets up a ¯rm before µi is
realized. We assume that setting up a ¯rm requires a ¯xed payment K, which
should be interpreted as the cost of establishing a brand name, acquiring a cus-
9Our main argument would still hold if we assumed that, after a default, the government is
unable to borrow for a limited number of periods.
10This part of the model is reminiscent to Harms and Zink (2005).
8tomer basis etc.. Since agents are born without an endowment, they have to
borrow this amount on the international capital market. The interest rate an en-
trepreneur has to pay to foreign creditors is denoted by RP. If the entrepreneur
is \successful", i.e. if µi = 1, she hires workers, pays wages as well as interest and
principal on her loan, and retains the rest. At the end of the period, she sells
the ¯rm to an entrepreneur of the next cohort at a price Vi. If the entrepreneur
fails { i.e. if µi = 0 { she becomes a worker. To allow for varying degrees of
contract enforceability, we introduce the parameter ° 2 [0;1] and assume that,
in case of failure, international creditors get hold of the amount °RPK.11 In the
extreme case of ° = 1, private contracts are perfectly enforceable across national
boundaries. Conversely, if ° = 0, a failed entrepreneur who declares \private
default" is able to abscond completely, and the foreign creditor has to write o®




p + (1 ¡ p)°
: (2)
We assume that the e®ective costs of a loan also depend on the quality of
the \¯nancial infrastructure", i.e. on the degree of competition in the ¯nancial
sector, the extent of government regulation etc. These aspects are captured by the
parameter c, which decreases in the quality of the ¯nancial infrastructure. Note
that, by allowing c to di®er across countries and time periods, we introduce a
parameter which potentially in°uences private borrowing without being a®ected
by the likelihood of default. This will turn out to be extremely useful in the
empirical analysis.
3.2 Entrepreneurs and workers
Given our assumptions, the expected utility of an entrepreneur can be written as
follows:
11We assume that successful entrepreneurs comply with their repayment obligations.
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D
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+(1 ¡ p)[q(w ¡ T ¡ c ¡ °R
PK) + (1 ¡ q)(w ¡ c ¡ °R
PK)]; (3)
where ¼i is revenue minus wages, w is the real wage, V ND
i is the value of the
¯rm if the government honors its international debt, and V D
i is the ¯rm value in
case of default. Given our assumption that setting up a ¯rm requires an initial
investment of K and that Gt+1 = 0 if the government defaults in period t, it is
straightforward to show that V ND
i = K and V D
i = 0: if the government keeps
supplying productive infrastructure, aging (successful) entrepreneurs meet the
perfectly elastic demand of future entrepreneurs who are willing to pay the price
K, i.e. exactly the sum it would take to set up a new ¯rm. In case of default,
production dies down, and there is no subsequent entrepreneurial class willing to
purchase old ¯rms.
Using this result, we can reformulate (3) to get
E[U
e




PK] ¡ c + (1 ¡ p)w ¡ q(R
GG ¡ pK): (4)
Note that the last term in brackets succinctly illustrates entrepreneurs' atti-
tude towards public default: on the one hand, a defaulting government does not
raise taxes which allows for higher consumption. On the other hand, government
default destroys ¯rm value, and this hurts successful entrepreneurs.
The number of entrepreneurs n¤ is determined by a equilibrium condition
which guarantees that the expected utility of becoming a { potentially failed {
entrepreneur equals the expected utility of abstaining from international capital
markets:




PK + qK] ¡ c ¡ qR
GG + (1 ¡ p)w = w ¡ qR
GG; (5)
10where the RHS gives expected utility of an agent who does not borrow. The
technology given by (1) and the assumption that labor markets are perfectly
competitive imply that






In a symmetric equilibrium, the number of workers per ¯rm is given by the
number of agents who decided not to borrow plus the number of failed entrepre-
neurs, divided by the number of successful entrepreneurs. Denoting the number

























Figure 4 demonstrates how the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs n¤ is
determined for given values of q and G: the LHS of (9) is upward-sloping in








RHS is downward-sloping. The point of intersection gives the equilibrium number
of workers per ¯rm. The lower quadrant shows how to translate this value into
the equilibrium number of successful entrepreneurs m¤. Dividing m¤ by p yields
the equilibrium number of agents who set up ¯rms, n¤. Accordingly, the volume
of private foreign borrowing is given by n¤K.
113.3 Comparative statics
It follows from (9) that raising ÁG or p has a positive e®ect on m¤ whereas raising
c or RW lowers the equilibrium number of successful entrepreneurs.12 Moreover,
q has a positive e®ect on m¤: a higher likelihood that the government will honor
its debt and will be able to ¯nance public infrastructure in the next period raises
the expected value of a ¯rm and thus makes it more attractive to become an
entrepreneur. This relationship is depicted by the function m¤(q) in Figure 5.
Note that m¤(0) > 0 and m¤(1) < 1: even if the government defaults for sure,
current pro¯ts are strictly positive and the supply of entrepreneurs does not
completely dry out. Conversely, diminishing returns to labor make sure that
some agents will decide not to become entrepreneurs even if q = 1.
3.4 The government's default decision
When deciding whether to default on its debt, the government maximizes the
sum of domestic agents' utilities. Moreover, it takes into account the ( economic
and reputational) costs of default. These costs are represented by the variable ½
which is de¯ned on the support [¡1;+1] with distribution function F. The fact
that the costs ½ may become negative is meant to re°ect other exogenous political
and economic shocks that possibly induce the government to discriminate against
foreign creditors. Given these assumptions, we can state that a default takes place
if the following condition is satis¯ed:
12While raising the likelihood of entrepreneurial success p increases m¤, the impact on foreign
borrowing n¤K = m¤K=p is ambiguous. The economic explanation for this result runs as
follows: on the one hand, a higher likelihood of entrepreneurial success reduces the e®ective
costs of borrowing. On the other hand, however, a higher share of \surviving" entrepreneurs
reduces the number of workers per ¯rm and thus squeezes expected pro¯ts. While raising p may
thus actually lower the volume of private foreign borrowing, the e®ect on RP is unambiguous:
obviously, a higher value of p results in a lower interest rate.
12½ < (1 ¡ m)R
GG + m(R
GG ¡ K) (10)
The ¯rst term on the right hand side re°ects workers' interests, who un-
ambiguously bene¯t from a default. The second term re°ects the position of
(successful) entrepreneurs who are torn between the appeal of lower taxation and
the desire to protect their capital gains.
The inequality in (10) implies that the government chooses to repay its debt
if the costs of default exceed a threshold value ^ ½ which is given by
^ ½ = R
GG ¡ mK: (11)
Conversely, the government defaults if ½ < ^ ½. The likelihood of repayment is
thus given by q = 1 ¡ F(^ ½).
Recall that the interest rate RG charged by international investors is RW=q
and that m denotes the number of successful entrepreneurs. The equilibrium
likelihood of repayment is thus implicitly given by
q






In what follows, we assume that (12) has a unique solution, as illustrated in
Figure 6.13 Obviously, q¤ decreases in G and increases in m. The latter relation-
ship re°ects the fact that, with m increasing, the \capital costs" of default get
a larger weight in the government's objective function, making it less attractive
to default. This e®ect is magni¯ed by a multiplier-like process, through which a
higher level of q lowers RG, which further increases q etc. The relationship be-
tween m and the likelihood of repayment is depicted by the line q¤(m) in Figure 7.
Note that q¤(0) > 0: even if there are no entrepreneurs, the costs of default may
13Without this assumption, and without imposing more structure on the function F, we
would have to allow for the possibility that there are multiple solutions to (12) or no solution
at all.
13be high enough to induce the government to repay its debt. Conversely, q¤(1) < 1:
even if all agents are entrepreneurs, other shocks may be strong enough to trigger
default.
3.5 Comparative static properties of the equilibrium
In Figure 7, the equilibrium values meq and qeq are given by the intersection of
the two lines m¤(q) and q¤(m), i.e. by the joint solution of equations (9) and
(12). The fact that q¤(0) > 0, q¤(1) < 1, m¤(0) > 0, m¤(1) < 1 guarantees that
m¤(q) cuts q¤(m) from below.
How does this equilibrium react to changes in the exogenous variables? Im-
proving the ¯nancial infrastructure, i.e. lowering c shifts the m¤(q) curve to the
right: reducing the costs of borrowing makes it more attractive to set up a ¯rm for
a given value of q, raising m¤(q). The greater number of successful entrepreneurs,
in turn, makes it less attractive to default and raises q. As a result, both meq and
qeq increase: foreign lending by private agents increases, and this development is
accompanied by an improving creditworthiness of the domestic government. In a
similar fashion, raising the productive share of government spending Á increases
meq and qeq. Note, however, that raising the total volume of G has an ambigu-
ous e®ect on meq and qeq since, for a given value of Á, increasing G raises the
attractiveness of becoming an entrepreneur, but also the tax burden and thus the
incentive to default. Finally, raising p, the likelihood of entrepreneurial success,
increases both meq and qeq by shifting the m¤(q)-curve to the right.
3.6 Discussion
While we modeled the private costs of sovereign default as resulting from a
contraction of public borrowing and the associated breakdown in productivity-
enhancing infrastructure services, we would like to point out that our theoretical
framework allows for a wide array of alternative interpretations: capital losses
14could, e.g., result from restricted private-sector access to international lending
as documented by Arteta and Hale (2006). If economic activity hinges on the
availability of international credit, the consequences of government default would
be the same as in our model.
Moreover, sovereign default is often associated with a massive depreciation of
the domestic currency. If private sector loans are denominated in foreign currency
and if goods prices do not adjust immediately, such a depreciation has a dramatic
e®ect on ¯rms' pro¯tability. This is another channel through which public default
generates costs for private debtors.
Hence, we do not claim that our model highlights the only channel through
which sovereign default in°icts costs on the private sector. We do, however,
believe that our theoretical framework conveys the gist of our argument, namely
that private foreign borrowing results in growing opposition against government
default. Endowed with this hypothesis, we turn to the empirical analysis.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Model speci¯cation
The central claim of this paper is that an increase of private foreign borrow-
ing in developing countries re°ects the emergence of an \entrepreneurial class"
which is hurt by the consequences of government default. These losses are taken
into account by support-maximizing politicians and thus raise the likelihood that
the government meets its repayment obligations. An exogenous shift in private
borrowing should thus raise sovereign creditworthiness.
The rest of the paper will be devoted to estimating variants of the following
equation:
qit = ¯nnit + ¯GGit +
K X
k=1
°k xk;it + »t + "it (13)
15,
where qit is a proxy for sovereign creditworthiness in country i at time t, nit
and Git re°ect private and public foreign borrowing, respectively, xk;it are control
variables, »t are time dummies and "it the usual error term. The unit of time
measurement is ¯ve years, re°ecting the persistence of sovereign creditworthiness
and the fact that the political economy considerations we have modeled are likely
to have a discernible e®ect on creditworthiness only at a low frequency. The
variables used in our regressions will therefore either be ¯ve-year averages (1980-
84, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004), or initial values of the respective
¯ve-year periods.
The key hypothesis we want to test is that ¯n is positive. However, this is
complicated by the fact that { as illustrated by equation (9) { private foreign
borrowing is a function of sovereign risk: a higher likelihood of public default
reduces the expected return on entrepreneurial activity and thus reduces the
incentive to borrow abroad.14 Estimating (13) by OLS would therefore produce
biased parameter estimates. However, however, our theoretical model suggests
a number of \shift parameters" which we can use as instruments to identify ¯n:
most importantly, we will use proxies for c (the costs of borrowing), Á (the share
of public loans that are used productively) and p (the likelihood of entrepreneurial
success). Exogenous variations in these variables result in variations of private
borrowing which are not due to changes in government creditworthiness. The
validity of this claim will have to be con¯rmed using tests of instrument relevance
and exclusion restrictions, as discussed below.
14Recent empirical research also shows that a higher assessment of sovereign risk may reduce
corporate credit ratings and lower the supply of credit to private borrowers (see Durbin and
Ng (2005), Borensztein et al. (2006b))
164.2 Data
We proceed by introducing the proxies and control variables we use to estimate
(13): To capture the likelihood of public debt repayment (q), we use the ¯ve-
year average of the Institutional Investor's rating of country creditworthiness
(IICCR). The IICCR ranks countries on a scale from 0 to 100, with a lower
rating re°ecting a higher likelihood that borrowers in this country will default on
their debt. The ratings are \...based on information provided by senior economists
and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and money management and
securities ¯rms" (Institutional Investor, 2002:170) and have been published twice
per year since 1979.15
The advantage of the IICCR is its large country coverage and its regular
frequency. Although it does not exclusively refer to the likelihood of government
default, we conjecture that sovereign risk makes up for a large share of \country
creditworthiness". Our conjecture is con¯rmed by comparing the Institutional
Investor rating to ratings which explicitly focus on government creditworthiness,
but cover a smaller number of countries and years.16
The variables re°ecting private and public foreign borrowing are taken from
the World Bank's Global Development Finance database: n is proxied by the
volume of \private non-guaranteed loans disbursed" relative to a country's GNI,
averaged over ¯ve years (PRIV LOANS). We believe that \loans disbursed" are
a closer analogue to n than, e.g., \net °ows" (loans disbursed minus principal
repayments) or \net transfers" (net °ows minus interest payments) since they
represent foreign borrowing in the current period, and are not a®ected by past
capital in°ows. To operationalize G, we use the volume of \public and publicly
guaranteed loans disbursed", also divided by GNI and averaged over ¯ve years
15As reported by Haque et al. (1996), the individual criteria used by banks to assess default
risk are not speci¯ed.
16The rank correlation between the IICCR and the sovereign ratings published by Moody's
in the 1990s is 0.92. The rank-correlation with the sovereign ratings of FitchRatings is 0.85.
17(PUBLOANS). Note that we do not distinguish between di®erent sources of
loans. That is, public borrowing comprises both loans of international institutions
and loans of private investors. In the later part of the paper, we will check whether
our key ¯ndings are robust to the use of alternative proxies for n and G.
As discussed above, private borrowing increases in the quality of the ¯nan-
cial infrastructure, which is re°ected by the variable c. As a proxy for (the
inverse of) c, we use the Fraser Institute's measure of credit market regulation
(CREDREG). This index, which is de¯ned on a scale from zero to ten { with
higher variables re°ecting a more favorable regulatory environment { captures
the administrative hurdles and entry barriers that raise the costs of borrowing.
Among the criteria that enter this index is the degree of competition faced by
domestic banks, the presence of interest rate controls etc. The Fraser Institute
has been publishing this index every ¯ve years between 1970 and 2000. Since
2001 the index is available on an annual basis. In our regressions, we use the
initial values of CREDREG for the di®erent ¯ve-year periods.17
To capture the share of government borrowing that is used productively (Á),
we need a measure of \governance". We use the squared distance from the equa-
tor (LATITUDE) as a ¯rst proxy, referring to the argument of, e.g., Acemoglu et
al. (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al (2004) that geographical
and climatic factors play an important role in shaping the quality of institutions.
Based on the idea that more autocratic governments are more likely to squander
the means borrowed abroad, we use the Freedom House (2006) measure of polit-
ical rights (POLRIGHTS) as an additional proxy for Á. Finally, we construct
a measure of the quality of governance based on the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) country risk ratings (Political Risk Services (2006)). We take a
17We also experimented with alternative proxies of the ¯nancial infrastructure such as bank-
ing system competition (Abiad et al. (2007)) and concentration Beck et al. (2000)), which are
available annually but for a smaller sample of countries. However, these variables did not have
any value added over CREDREG in terms of improving the ¯rst-stage ¯t.
18simple average of three indices that measure the quality of the bureaucracy, the
rule of law, and the prevalence of corruption, where a higher rating indicates
better governance. We note that this variable (GOV ERNANCE) not only cap-
tures the share of foreign public borrowing that is likely to be used productively,
but also the investment climate facing the private sector. A higher value of the
index is likely to be associated with fewer bureaucratic, administrative, and legal
hurdles for private businesses, and therefore would be expected to be positively
correlated with PRIV LOANS.18
The hardest task is to ¯nd instruments which capture the likelihood of en-
trepreneurial success. Arguing that high and stable export demand growth im-
proves business prospects, especially in economies which are heavily dependent
on agricultural and raw materials exports, we use the ¯ve-year average of trading
partners' GDP growth, lagged by one period (TPGROWTHAV (¡1)) as well as
the standard deviation of these growth rates (TPGROWTHSD) as proxies for
p. As with the other instruments, the conjecture that this variable in°uences
sovereign creditworthiness only through its e®ect on PRIV LOANS will have to
be tested.
Concerning the control variables, we follow the studies of Haque et al. (1996)
as well as Harms and Rauber (2006). First and foremost, we use the lagged ¯ve-
year average of the IICCR as a regressor (IICCR(¡1)). A dynamic speci¯cation
is suggested by Haque et al. (1996:718) who ¯nd that \there is considerable per-
sistence in the ratings, so that a country tends to retain its rating over time unless
signi¯cant adverse or positive developments occur". While the low frequency of
our data set is likely to reduce the persistence of IICCR, it turned out that the
¯t of our model improved substantially when we included the lagged dependent
18Carefully testing whether this variable can, in fact, be excluded from the IICCR equation
will be crucial, since a government that uses resources more productively is more likely to be
able to raise the taxes needed to service future debt obligations, and therefore have higher
creditworthiness.
19variable.
Additional control variables are: the log of a country's real, PPP-adjusted
per capita income at the beginning of a ¯ve-year period (INCOME), the initial
level of government debt as a share of GNI (GOV DEBT), the initial volume of
reserves as a share of imports (RESERV ES), the log of the average in°ation
rate in the past ¯ve-year period (INFLA(¡1)), and the inital degree of trade
openness (OPEN), measured as the ratio of exports and imports to GNI.19 We
also control for the contemporaneous ¯ve-year average of an index of government
stability (GOV STABILITY ), compiled by the ICRG, as a measure of political
risk.20 Finally, we include regional dummies for East Asia, Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, South Asia, Latin America and Subsaharan Africa.
Given our choice of proxies and control variables, the empirical model is spec-
i¯ed as follows:






As outlined above, we will estimate this equation applying instrumental vari-
able (IV) techniques. Note that we do not initially decompose the disturbance "it
into an unobserved country ¯xed e®ect and an idiosyncratic white noise error. In
most regressions, we report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity
19We also experimented with including the initial or lagged values of the current account
balance and the central government budget balance in the set of controls, but found these vari-
ables to be insigni¯cant in all regressions. Using the contemporaneous values of these variables
would be problematic as they include interest payments which are likely to be in°uenced by
the sovereign credit rating.
20GOV STABILITY provides an assessment both of the government's ability to carry out its
declared programs and its ability to stay in o±ce. The rating is the sum of three subcomponents,
namely government unity, legislative strength, and popular support.
20and serial correlation within clusters. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, two
stage least squares (TSLS) estimation is consistent, but a generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimator, which optimizes the weights of the moment condi-
tions, is more e±cient (see Baum et al. (2003)). At the same time, the limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator is more robust (in terms of
having lower bias and more reliable standard errors) than the GMM estimator
when the instruments are not strongly correlated with the endogenous variables.21
We therefore apply the GMM estimator in most regressions, also reporting the
Cragg and Donald (1993) ¯rst stage statistic of instrument relevance, as well as
the LIML estimate of the coe±cient of PRIVLOANS and the con¯dence intervals
of this coe±cient based on the Moreira (2003) conditional likelihood ratio test
statistic.22 Finally, we also present Arellano and Bond (1991) di®erence-GMM
estimates that are robust to the presence of unobserved ¯xed country e®ects in
the IICCR equation.23
21Comprehensive surveys on weak instruments are provided by Stock et al. (2002) and Stock
and Yogo (2005). Stock and Yogo (2005) propose a formal test for weak instruments based on
the Cragg and Donald (1993) statistic and compile critical values of the statistic that indicate
the maximal bias and size distortion of TSLS relative to OLS. For the case of a single endogenous
regressor and three instruments, for example, the Cragg and Donald statistic would have to
exceed 9.08, 6.46, or 5.39 to conclude that the TSLS maximal bias is less than 10, 20, or 30
percent of the OLS bias, respectively.
22The Moreira (2003) test statistic, which is robust to the presence of weak instruments, is
presented for the case of a single endogenous regressor. We note that the critical values of the
Cragg and Donald (1993) test as compiled by Stock and Yogo (2005), as well as the Moreira
(2003) likelihood ratio test were developed under the assumption of homoskedasticity.
23We used the ivreg2 module programmed for Stata by Baum et al. (2003) to implement the
GMM and LIML estimators, the condivreg module to implement the Moreira (2003) conditional




In the theoretical model of section 2, public borrowing G was assumed to be
exogenous with respect to sovereign creditworthiness. However, this assumption
may not be correct if governments take their own sovereign credit rating into
account when making foreign borrowing decisions. As a ¯rst step, we estimate
equation (14) by instrumenting both PRIV LOANS and PUBLOANS using
CREDREG, LATITUDE, GOV ERNANCE, POLRIGHTS, TPGROWTHAV (¡1)
and TPGROWTHSD. The estimates, shown in the ¯rst column in Table 1, sug-
gest private foreign borrowing to have a strong positive e®ect on creditworthiness,
but public borrowing to be insigni¯cant. The Cragg and Donald (1993) statistic
suggests that our instruments are weak.24 However, the LIML estimates (shown
in the last two rows for the coe±cient of PRIV LOANS), which are relatively
robust to weak instruments, con¯rm our conclusions about the coe±cients of
PRIV LOANS and PUBLOANS.25
Except for OPEN, which is estimated to have a negative impact on cred-
itworthiness, most of the control variables have the expected sign and are sig-
ni¯cant: sovereign creditworthiness increases with real per capita income, de-
creases with policies that lead to high in°ation, increases strongly with gov-
ernment stability and international reserves. The fact that public borrowing
(PUBLOANS) has no signi¯cant e®ect may seem surprising at ¯rst glance.
Note, however, that our model did not o®er any hypothesis on the e®ect of this
variable. When we implemented "di®erence in Sargan" C-tests to con¯rm the en-
24critical values of this statistic compiled by Stock and Yogo (2005) imply that the maximal
bias of the TSLS estimator based on these instruments could exceed 30 percent of the OLS
bias.
25The LIML estimate of the coe±cient of PUBLOANS in this speci¯cation is 2.103 with a
standard error of 4.475, suggesting that it is statistically insigni¯cant.
22dogeneity of PRIV LOANS and PUBLOANS, we failed to reject the hypothesis
that PUBLOANS is exogenous with respect to sovereign creditworthiness while
we accepted that PRIV LOANS is indeed endogenous with respect to sovereign
creditworthiness. We therefore proceed by eliminating PUBLOANS from the
set of endogenous regressors.
Column (2) displays the result of estimating (14) by GMM using the same set
of exogenous instruments for PRIVLOANS. The estimates indicate that PRIV LOANS
has a strong positive e®ect on sovereign risk. Although we obtain a much better
¯t in the ¯rst stage relative to the previous regression and also accept the valid-
ity of the excluded instruments, our equation is still not strongly identi¯ed: the
Cragg and Donald (1993) statistic suggests the TSLS bias in this speci¯cation
could reach up to 20 percent of the OLS bias.
In the next regression, we eliminate the instruments referring to trading part-
ners' GDP growth rates (TPGROWTHAV (¡1) and TPGROWTHSD) and the
index of political rights (POLRIGHTS) from the set of excluded instruments
for PRIVLOANS, given that these variables are not statistically signi¯cant (at 10
percent or less) in the ¯rst-stage regression. The results are displayed in column
(3) of Table 1. The ¯rst stage Cragg-Donald statistic capturing the signi¯cance
of the excluded instruments climbs to 9.6 implying fairly strong identi¯cation in
the ¯rst stage.26 The Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions suggests
the instruments to be jointly valid and the model to be well speci¯ed, and the
di®erence in Sargan tests for the exclusion of the individual instruments (not
shown) fail to reject the exogeneity of the instruments.
In column (4) we present the LIML estimates of the speci¯cation in column
(3) as a robustness check. The coe±cient estimates of all regressors are quite
26With a single endogenous regressor and three excluded instruments, the critical values of
the Cragg-Donald statistic suggests the maximal TSLS bias to be between 5 to 10 percent of the
OLS bias. In the ¯rst stage regression, the p-value of the coe±cient estimates of CREDREG,
LATITUDE and GOV ERNANCE are 0.037, 0.073 and 0.015, respectively.
23similar to the GMM estimates given in column (3). The Moreira (2003) condi-
tional likelihood statistic strongly rejects the hypothesis that the coe±cient on
the endogenous variable, PRIV LOANS, is zero, as the con¯dence interval im-
plied by this test suggests that the coe±cient of PRIV LOANS is within the
interval [2.317, 6.142] with 95 percent probability.
Finally, we check whether our results are just driven by unobserved hetero-
geneity: if "it = ®i+ºit and if the\unobserved e®ect" ®i is correlated with the re-
gressors, our estimates are biased. The presence of the lagged dependent variable
IICCR(¡1) on the right hand side prevents us from simply including country
¯xed e®ects in the regressions, given that the time dimension of our sample is
maximum ¯ve per country.27 We therefore follow the di®erence GMM approach
of Arellano and Bond (1991) and estimate (14) by di®erencing the equation and
by using lagged levels of the regressors as instruments.
In the regression presented in column (5) we use the ¯rst and second lags of
the levels of all the included regressors, excluding PRIV LOANS, for which we in-
clude the contemporaneous levels of CREDREG, LATITUDE, and GOV ERNANCE
as instruments. Although the point estimate of the coe±cient on PRIV LOANS
is somewhat smaller than in the previous regressions this di®erence does not
appear to be signi¯cant. The 95 percent con¯dence interval of the coe±cient es-
timate of PRIV LOANS in this regression ([1.116, 2.742]) largely overlaps with
those estimated in the previous regressions ([1.430, 5.704] in the GMM regression
in column (3) and [2.087,5.227] in the LIML regression in column (4)), suggest-
ing no large, statistically discernible e®ect of unobserved heterogeneity on our
previous estimates. Moreover, the estimated coe±cient of the lagged dependent
variable, which would have been expected to be upward biased in the previous
regressions if unobserved heterogeneity were indeed present, is virtually the same
27See Nickell (1981) for a derivation of the bias associated with the use of dummy variables
in dynamic panel estimations.
24in the di®erence-GMM regression as in the previous regressions. Combined with
the fact that the coe±cient estimates on the remaining regressors are largely
unchanged, these ¯ndings suggest that there is no signi¯cant unobserved hetero-
geneity in the error term and that the previous results presented in columns 1-4
are not tainted by such heterogeneity.
The regression in column 6 checks the robustness of the di®erence-GMM es-
timates by increasing the number of lags included in the instrument set. In
particular, we use up to four lags of all instruments, rather than restricting them
to the ¯rst two lags and the contemporaneous levels for the included and ex-
cluded instruments, respectively, as we did in the previous regression. Given the
problems associated with over¯tting in di®erence-GMM estimates, we impose
the coe±cients to be uniform across the time periods in the ¯rst stage.28 As
before, this regression yields a statistically signi¯cant and positive estimated co-
e±cient on PRIVLOANS (with a 95 percent con¯dence interval of [0.439, 3.100]),
largely unchanged point estimates on the remaining regressors, and an Hansen
overidentifying-restrictions test statistic which con¯rms the validity of the instru-
ments and the speci¯cation.
4.3.2 Varying speci¯cations
In this subsection we present various robustness checks on the estimates obtained
in the benchmark regression presented in column (3) of Table 1. We begin by
testing whether our results depend on the inclusion of any particular instrument
and whether our instruments can safely be excluded from the set of controls
in the IICCR equation. The regression in column (1) of Table 2 omits credit
regulation from the set of excluded instruments and includes it in the second
stage equation. This alteration leaves the coe±cient estimate of PRIV LOANS
largely unchanged, and yields an insigni¯cant coe±cient on CREDREG in the
28We do this by using the collapse option in the xtabond2 routine in Stata.
25IICCR equation. Columns (2) and (3) carry out the same exercise by including
LATITUDE and GOV ERNANCE, respectively, in the IICCR equation rather
than in the set of excluded instruments. We continue to have a relatively strong
¯rst stage ¯t, reject the joint hypothesis that the instruments are not valid and the
equation is misspeci¯ed, and ¯nd a positive and statistically signi¯cant e®ect of
PRIV LOANS on IICCR. Moreover, none of the formerly-excluded instruments
enters the IICCR equation with a statistically signi¯cant coe±cient. This ¯nding
con¯rms that PRIV LOANS is not picking up the omitted e®ect of the quality
of governance.
So far, we have used the volume of private foreign borrowing relative to GNI
as a proxy for the size of the "entrepreneurial class neq, or, more generally, for
the strength of political resistance against government default. In column (4) of
Table 2 we use the initial level of private foreign debt instead of private foreign
borrowing to test whether our a±rmative results are an artifact of this particular
choice. While our theoretical model points to the volume of new loans as a
proxy for neq, the initial stock of private debt is also proportional to the private-
sector costs of public default. The estimates presented in column (4) indicate
that our key hypothesis that private exposure to international capital markets
has a positive e®ect on creditworthiness is also supported if we use this modi¯ed
speci¯cation.
In all the previous regressions, we have included the ICRG measure of gov-
ernment stability (GOV STABILITY ) as a measure of political risk, and this
variable has consistently been estimated to have a signi¯cant positive e®ect on
sovereign creditworthiness. In the regression in column (5) we replace this variable
with an index measuring the "investment pro¯le" of a country (IPROFILE).
Compiled by the ICRG, this variable provides an assessment of the risk of con-
tract repudiation, expropriation, limited pro¯t repatriation, and payment de-
lays. We ¯nd this variable to have a strong positive e®ect on IICCR, as does
GOV STABILITY , but the main ¯ndings on PRIV LOANS and other vari-
26ables are not changed signi¯cantly by its inclusion.
Returning to our benchmark speci¯cation (column (3) in Table 1), we ¯nally
test whether our results are robust to using Moody's sovereign credit ratings
rather than the IICCR as the dependent variable. Although this results in a much
reduced sample size, our results still indicate a positive e®ect of PRIV LOANS
on creditworthiness. However, we note that the results in this column need to be
treated with caution given that most other regressors loose their signi¯cance and
that, in some cases, we see large changes in the size of their coe±cient estimates.
4.3.3 Robustness to using varying samples
In this subsection we test whether our results survive small modi¯cations in
sample size. Column (1) of Table 3 displays the results of omitting observations
for which PRIV LOANS equals zero. This has almost no impact on our results.
Similarly, omitting those countries for which PRIV LOANS was greater than
15 percent does not in°uence our results (column (2)). Likewise, omitting the
transition economies, most of which received strong capital in°ows in the 1990s
does not have a signi¯cant impact (column (3)). Finally, in column (4) we include
observations only from 1990 onward. This signi¯cantly improves the ¯rst stage
¯t and the signi¯cance of most of our estimates in the second stage, but yields
a problematic value of the Hansen J test of the overidentifying restrictions. We
therefore repeated the exercise in columns (1)-(3) in Table 2 by including each
of our instruments in the IICCR equation. Columns (5)-(7) show the estimates
from regressions where CREDREG, LATITUDE, and GOV ERNANCE are
respectively included among the set of controls. All these regressions yield a
signi¯cant coe±cient on PRIV LOANS, statistically insigni¯cant coe±cients on
the new controls, and Hansen J statistics that do not signal problems with the
validity of the speci¯cation and instruments.
275 Summary and conclusions
While external debt ¯gures among the usual suspects when it comes to explaining
sovereign risk, little attention has been devoted to the potentially di®erent e®ects
of private and public foreign borrowing. The main contribution of our paper is
to emphasize that this di®erence is substantial, and that higher private foreign
borrowing may raise government creditworthiness by increasing the political costs
of default.
Our empirical results lend support to this view: even if we account for the mu-
tual dependence of sovereign risk and private borrowing, the causal relationship
outlined above is clearly discernible: an exogenous increase in private exposure
to international capital markets { triggered, e.g., by an improved regulatory en-
vironment in the ¯nancial sector { raises governments' creditworthiness.
However, the empirical success of our simple hypothesis should not mask
the complex interaction between private borrowing, public borrowing, and the
likelihood of ¯nancial crises: by focusing on the political-economy implications
of private sector exposure, we have not allowed private sector borrowing to have
a negative impact on sovereign creditworthiness { e.g. by raising the likelihood
of a costly ¯scal bailout as described by Reinhart (2002). Moreover, we have
modeled the default decision of the private sector in a rather simpli¯ed fashion.
Allowing successful entrepreneurs to deny repayment would move the model closer
to reality and partially shift the focus from ¯nancial sector deregulation towards
the enforcement of property rights.
Finally, we used the volume of private foreign borrowing as a proxy for the size
of the \entrepreneurial class". The assumption that all agents borrow the same
amount on international capital markets is, of course, heroic. Departing from this
assumption would require to look at the cross-sectional distribution of foreign
borrowing. If such activities were concentrated in the hands of a few agents, this
would lower the share of the population opposing government default. However,
28it would also raise the stakes and political activism of those agents, such that,
from a theoretical point of view, the overall impact on sovereign creditworthiness
is ambiguous. We believe that these and related questions provide ample scope
for future research.
6 Data appendix
6.1 De¯nitions and sources
CREDREG: Initial value of the Fraser Institute's index of credit market regulation,
ranging from 0 (minimal regulation) to 10 (maximal regulation). Criteria: (i) Owner-
ship of banks: percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks; (ii) Competition:
domestic banks face competition from foreign banks; (iii) Extension of credit: percent-
age of credit extended to private sector; (iv) Avoidance of interest rate controls and
regulations that lead to negative real interest rates; (v) Interest rate controls: inter-
est rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely determined by the market.
Source:Fraser Institute (2006).
GOVDEBT: Initial value of (outstanding external debt of public sector or guaran-
teed for repayment by a public entity)/GNI Sources: World Bank (2006a), World Bank
(2006b).
GOVERNANCE: Simple average of indices measuring bureaucratic quality, corrup-
tion, and the rule of law, from the International Country Risk Guide. Source: Political
Risk Services (2006).
GOVSTABILITY: Index of government stability from the International Country
Risk Guide. Source: Political Risk Services (2006).
Institutional Investor Country Credit Rating (IICCR): Country Credit Rat-
ings published in the Institutional Investor magazine every March and September since
1980. Source: Institutional Investor magazine.
INCOME: Log of initial value of real per capita income in constant PPP-adjusted
dollars. Source: World Bank (2006a).
29INFLA(-1): Average growth rate of the consumer price index in the preceding ¯ve-
year period. Source: World Bank (2006a)
LATITUDE: Squared latitude. Source: World Bank (2001).
OPEN: Initial value of the ratio (Exports + imports)/GNI. Source: World Bank
(2006a)
POLRIGHTS: Five-year average of the Freedom House index of political rights, rang-
ing from 1 (maximal rights) to 7 (minimal rights).Sources: Freedom House (2006).
PRIVLOANS: Five-year average of (foreign loans disbursed to private entities and
not guaranteed for repayment by a public entity)/GNI.Sources: World Bank (2006a),
World Bank (2006b).
PUBLOANS: Five year average of (foreign loans disbursed to public debtor or guar-
anteed for repayment by a public entity)/GNI.Sources: World Bank (2006a), World
Bank (2006b).
RESERVES: Initial value of the ratio (International reserves)/(Imports of goods and
services) Source: World Bank (2006a).
TPGROWTHAV(-1): Lagged ¯ve-year average of the growth rate of a weighted
average of trading partners' GDP. Sources: World Bank (2006a) and IMF (2006).
TPGROWTHSD: Five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of a weighted
average of trading partners' GDP. Sources: World Bank (2006a) and IMF (2006).
6.2 Countries
Algeria , Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon,
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El Salvador, Estonia, Gabon,
Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syr-
ian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela RB, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Table 1: The e®ect of PRIVLOANS on IICCR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRIVLOANS 3.462*** 3.558*** 3.567*** 3.657** 1.929*** 1.769***
[1.094] [1.054] [1.070] [1.405] [0.408] [0.667]
IICCR(-1) 0.421*** 0.410*** 0.394*** 0.394*** 0.392*** 0.462**
[0.104] [0.076] [0.081] [0.080] [0.098] [0.190]
PUBLOANS 0.143 0.278* 0.283* 0.28 0.515** 0.831***
[1.186] [0.163] [0.165] [0.177] [0.200] [0.271]
GOVSTABILITY 2.347*** 2.362*** 2.378*** 2.320*** 2.037*** 1.984***
[0.441] [0.398] [0.415] [0.488] [0.483] [0.643]
INCOME 4.424** 4.523*** 4.606*** 4.390*** 5.116 5.423
[1.798] [1.354] [1.358] [1.471] [6.637] [5.811]
GOVDEBT -0.01 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.018 -0.026*
[0.028] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.017] [0.015]
RESERVES 0.027 0.035 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.018 0.049
[0.041] [0.024] [0.014] [0.016] [0.047] [0.047]
INFLA(-1) -0.836* -0.838* -1.004** -1.019** -0.268 -0.383
[0.442] [0.430] [0.456] [0.498] [0.667] [0.687]
OPEN -0.054* -0.052* -0.052* -0.052 -0.085* -0.03
[0.029] [0.027] [0.027] [0.032] [0.049] [0.089]
R-squared 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.72
Observations 218 218 220 220 172 172
J-Statistic (p-value) 0.600 0.706 0.367 0.429 0.478 0.413
AB-Statistic (p-value) 0.440 0.850
Cragg-Donald statistic 1.199 4.494 9.579 9.579 ... ...
PRIVLOANS:
CLR test (p-value) ... 0.000 0.000 0.000 ... ...
CLR test (interval) ... [2.50, 7.12] [ 2.32, 6.14] [ 2.32, 6.14] ... ...
LIML (point estimate) 3.955*** 4.002*** 3.657*** ... ... ...
LIML (s.e.) 1.628 1.622 1.405 ...5 ... ...
Notes on Table 1:
Column (1): Both PRIV LOANS and PUBLOANS instrumented, GMM estimation. Column (2): Only
PRIV LOANS instrumented, GMM estimation, large set of instruments. Column (3): Only PRIV LOANS
instrumented, GMM estimation, reduced set of instruments. Column (4): Only PRIV LOANS instrumented,
LIML estimation, reduced set of instruments. Column (5): Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator, small number of
lags. Column (6): Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator, large number of lags.
Standard errors in parantheses, based on a robust covariance matrix. ***, **, *: signi¯cance levels of 1, 5,
3610 percent. The coe±cients of the time dummies and the constant (not shown) are available upon request.
The J-statistic refers to the Hansen-Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions. The AB-statistic refers to
the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in the ¯rst-di®erenced residuals. The Cragg Donald
(1993) statistic is an indicator of instrument weakness as described in the text. The CLR test is the conditional
likelihood ratio test of the signi¯cance of the coe±cient of the endogenous variable (available only for the case
of a single endogenous variable). LIML point estimates and standard errors correspond to the estimate of the
coe±cient of PRIVLOANS when the speci¯cation is estimated using the LIML estimator (with robust standard
errors). Column (4) shows the full LIML estimate of the speci¯cation estimated (by GMM) in column (3).
37Table 2: Varying speci¯cations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRIVLOANS 2.734** 4.204*** 3.471*** 2.309** 1.872**
[1.054] [1.451] [1.202] [0.942] [0.873]
IICCR(-1) 0.450*** 0.348*** 0.397*** 0.409*** 0.439***
[0.082] [0.105] [0.078] [0.088] [0.069]
GOVSTABILITY 2.225*** 2.520*** 2.294*** 2.432*** 1.78
[0.413] [0.467] [0.643] [0.517] [1.666]
PUBLOANS 0.294* 0.276 0.281* 0.158 -0.125
[0.148] [0.193] [0.155] [0.154] [0.946]
INCOME 4.127*** 4.945*** 4.552*** 2.576* 3.874*** 0.428
[1.301] [1.601] [1.499] [1.517] [1.040] [4.661]
GOVDEBT -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.021* -0.009 -0.068
[0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.007] [0.157]
RESERVES 0.046*** 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.034*** -0.006
[0.014] [0.017] [0.014] [0.017] [0.011] [0.093]
INFLA(-1) -0.635 -1.048* -1.000** -0.441 -0.674* 0.312
[0.529] [0.536] [0.441] [0.459] [0.375] [1.631]
OPEN -0.04 -0.068** -0.052* 0.006 -0.045* -0.031











R-Squared 0.8 0.67 0.74 0.68 0.84 0.78
Observations 220 220 220 215 220 50
J-Statistic (p-value) 0.26 0.62 0.14 0.23 0.67 0.90
Cragg-Donald statistic 11.11 10.09 8.38 10.35 6.22 5.51
Notes on Table 2:
Column (1): CREDREG used as included instrument. Column (2): LATITUDE used as included instru-
ment. Column (3): GOV ERNANCE used as included instrument. Column (4): Initial stock of private
foreign debt instead of average private borrowing used as regressor. Column (5): IPROFILE instead of
GOV STABILITY used as regressor. Column (6): Moody's sovereign rating instead of IICCR used as
regressor. Further notes: See Table 1
38Table 3: Varying Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PRIVLOANS 3.226*** 4.822*** 5.478** 2.571*** 3.412** 4.146*** 3.327***
[0.993] [1.625] [2.121] [0.647] [1.290] [1.407] [1.162]
IICCR(-1) 0.330*** 0.404*** 0.377*** 0.482*** 0.431*** 0.374*** 0.405***
[0.099] [0.093] [0.113] [0.079] [0.126] [0.127] [0.101]
GOVSTABILITY 2.644*** 2.273*** 2.310*** 2.823*** 2.497*** 2.650*** 2.225***
[0.506] [0.455] [0.490] [0.491] [0.606] [0.623] [0.817]
PUBLOANS 0.441 0.18 0.154 0.154 0.149 0.138 0.086
[0.292] [0.171] [0.167] [0.185] [0.196] [0.211] [0.197]
INCOME 4.790** 4.401*** 3.340** 3.237** 3.880** 4.615** 4.005**
[1.878] [1.507] [1.517] [1.434] [1.736] [1.903] [1.594]
GOVDEBT -0.055** -0.011 -0.015 -0.005 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[0.021] [0.009] [0.010] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007]
RESERVES 0.025 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.056***
[0.026] [0.016] [0.019] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014]
INFLA(-1) -0.972 -0.822* -0.898 -1.287*** -0.604 -0.7 -0.774
[0.596] [0.467] [0.609] [0.462] [0.621] [0.565] [0.470]
OPEN -0.068* -0.031 -0.007 -0.049** -0.046 -0.059* -0.049*







R-Squared 0.7 0.69 0.68 0.82 0.76 0.69 0.77
Observations 163 218 199 178 178 178 178
J-statistic (p-value) 0.41 0.35 0.42 0.09 0.33 0.83 0.37
Cragg and Donald statistic 7.74 7.50 6.13 16.18 9.24 8.69 7.92
Notes on Table 3:
Column (1): Omission of observations with PRIV LOANS = 0. Column (2): Omission of observations
with PRIV LOANS > 15. Column (3): Omission of transition economies. Column (4): Omission of 1980s.
Column (5): Omission of 1980s and CREDREG used as included instrument. Column (6): Omission of
1980s and LATITUDE used as included instrument. Column (7): Omission of 1980s and GOV ERNANCE
used as included instrument. Further notes: See Table 1
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Figure 3 . Average public and private external debt and borrowing before and after Moody’s 































































































































































Notes: Worldbank Global Development Finance database and Moody’s Investor Service. t=0 
denotes the year in which there was a sovereign rating upgrade. Rating upgrades that were 
preceeded by a rating change in the past 3 years were excluded. 
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